Abstract. In order to solve the problem of over-investment in the real estate industry, we took the public listed companies in the real estate sector as a sample to to study how their liability source structure and term structure affect the over-investment. By empirical research method, we found that 33.54% of real estate companies had excessive investment, Commercial credit and short-term debt of these companies can actually limit investment, while long-term debt and bank loans cannot play a role in curbing investment.
Introduction
It is well known that effective investment can enhance the company's value and promote the long-term development of the enterprise. The real estate industry is a favorable support for China's GDP, which can stimulate the healthy development of many related industries such as building materials and home decoration. However, the entire real estate market is oversupplied. Over investment and excess inventory have become the primary contradictions in the development of this industry. Therefore, the data from the real estate listed companies in 2011-2015 is used as samples in this article to establish and analyses the relationship between debt structure and over investment, revealing its great significance.
Theoretical Analysis and Research Assumptions

Over-investment Generated
Over-investment as a concept was joint-proposed by Meckling and Jensen (1976) [1] for the first time. The real estate industry has made a great contribution to the growth of China's GDP. Therefore, the government is highly concerned about this over-weighed industry, and the government has taken some initiatives to interfere financing and investing behavior, and even to give financial convenience. The total investment amount in China's estate industry from 2008 to 2015 increased by 207.59%. From the beginning of 2010 to the end of 2015, the vacancy ratio of houses for sale rose continuously. At the end of 2015, the vacancy rate reached 46% and 720 million square meters of the built-area for sale. Such a high vacancy rate indicates that the real estate in China is a serious issue, with problems in inventory backlog and over-investment. For such scenario, it is reasonable to make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1: over-investment phenomenon widely exists in China's real estate listed companies
Debt Structure and Over-investment in Real Estate Enterprises
Stulz (1990) [2] finds that the best financing decision is influenced by the net present value and cash flow of each period, and if the firm makes the optimal strategy, it will reduce the manager's over-investment cost. However, this function is based on the hard constraints of debt. When there is a loophole in the external environment that companies face, the supervisory effect of institutions such as banks will decline, and the effect of over-investment constraints will also be weakened.
Moreover, most of the banks in China are influenced by its system, the state-owned ownership is more obvious. The bank is implicitly protected by the government, and less exposed to risk and more like to relax the terms of the loan. Based on the above analysis, the following assumptions are made.
Based on the above analysis, the following assumptions are made. Assumption 2a: it is not obvious that the effect of bank borrowing on over-investment of real estate companies in our country.
The commercial credit of real estate enterprises mainly comes from the advances of the constructors and the deposit of buyers. In 2015, deposits and advances received accounted for 25.93% of the total source of funds, and a sum of money payable to the constructors accounted for 48.8% of the total payables. Generally, the advances of the constructors are larger amount of funds, real estate companies will suffer a new round of funding pressures if repayment is not on time. So the following assumption is proposed:
Assumption 2b: Commercial credit can have a significant restraining effect on over-investment in real estate enterprises.
Jensen's research states that firms can limit over-investment led by agency conflicts through increasing short-term debt. Because business may face the pressure of repay the capital and interest in the short term, and in short term all managers of enterprises is so rational that they can make more reasonable decisions to reduce the possible abuse of funds. For long-term liabilities, long repayment term, it will not form a constraint in the short term but may provide managers with over-investment funds. Based on the analysis put up with the following assumptions:
Assumption 3: Short-term debt can have a significant restraining effect on over-investment in real estate enterprises, while long-term liabilities does not have a restrictive effect on over-investment in real estate enterprises.
Research Design
Data Sources
This article uses the data in the real estate listed companies from 2010 to 2015 as a sample. All the data came from the CSMAR database, presenting 755 observations from 142 real estate listed companies, excluding those newly listed real estate companies after 2009, as well as the current ST and ST * state listed companies and the companies with missing indicators and abnormal data, eventually with 650 valid data.
Variable Definitions
After reference to relevant literature of domestic and foreign scholars, this article selected variables as shown in Table 1 . Total investment = (expenditure on intangible assets purchased at the year plus expenditures on fixed assets + other assets with longer term assets + other investment expenditures at the end of the year)/(total assets at the beginning of the year).
Maintaining investment in fixed assets = (depreciation of fixed assets +long-term prepaid expenses)/(total assets at the beginning of the year 
Model Design
The research model in this paper is based on the model-construction method of Huang Jun, Huang Ni (2012) and Richardson (2006) [3] . The model (1) is established to test whether there is an over-investment in real estate enterprises in China. If Ɛ is greater than zero, it is considered as an over-investment problem exists. OInvi,t=η0+η1Shortbki,t-1+η2Longbki.t-1+η3Shortbki,t-1*Fcfi,t-1+η4Longbki,t-1*Fcfi,t-1+∑Year+ε (3) η n is coefficient.
Empirical Test Results and Analysis
The Test on Existence of Real Estate Enterprises Over-investment
The test results of model (1) are shown in Table 2 . The coefficient values between the various variables are within the reasonable range, illustrating that it does not exist any co-linearity problem. The adjusted R 2 values of the model is 0.492, which shows that the model is well fitted. Dar i,t-1 and the current investment expenditure shows a clear negative relationship at the 1% confidence, indicating that the total debt, to some extent, restricts the investment expenditure of real estate companies in China. The descriptive statistics of the residuals Ɛ are shown in Table 3 , in which the positive values accounted for 33.54% of the total sample, indicating that the over-investment phenomenon exists in more than one-thirds of the real estate companies publicly listed in China. The mean value for measuring over-investment is 0.10427, and the mean value for the under-investment is -0.0526, which shows that over-investment is quite severer than under-investment. All these clearly show that there is over-investment in real estate enterprises in China, supporting hypothesis 1.
The Restraint Effect of Debt Structure on Over-investment
Descriptive statistics of the variables related to the source and duration of liabilities are shows that there is a big difference between the maximum and minimum of over-investment, and the standard deviation is 0.2059, which illustrating that the over-expenditure phenomenon exists in different degree in the real estate companies in China, and the degree of difference is relatively large among the companies. The financing proportions in China's real estate companies are similar between banks borrowing and commercial credit, accounting for 20.94% and 21.39% of the total assets at the beginning of the period respectively. The short-term debt accounted for 46.54% of the total assets at the beginning of the period, and is more than three times that of the long-term debt.
The Restraint Effect of Different Sources of Debt on Over-investment. As seen from Table 4 , the adjusted R 2 value of the model is 0.271, which shows that the fitting degree of the model is fairly well and the explanatory variables can be used to analyze the explained variables. For the bank loan, its regression coefficient is negative, but this negative correlation is not significant, implying a lower restraining effect, which is related to the imperfect capital market in China and the insufficient supervision and regulation in the financial industry. This reflects that the bank loans had little restraint effect on over-investment. The cross-coefficient of bank deposits and Fcf is positive at 1% significance level, indicating that bank loans actually filled up the funding gap of the real estate companies, provided the companies with a hidden cash flow and subsequently incurred over-investment. These results are in supporting hypothesis 2a.
The regression coefficient in commercial credit is positive, with 5% significance at confidence level. When added with Fcf, the coefficient becomes negative, indicating that the credit relationship with the upstream and downstream customers can restrain these companies' over-investment behaviors.These results verify the hypothesis 2b. Table 5 , the regression coefficient of short-term debt is -0.261, which is significantly high at the level of 1%, indicating that debt with a relative short term has a negative relationship with over-investment. The long-term debt has a regression coefficient of -0.087. Although it shows that long-term debt is negatively correlated with over-investment, the significance is very low, indicating that long-term debts failed to play a role in restraining over-investment. The cross coefficient is 0.984 between variables Longbk and Fcf, very significant at 1% level, meaning that longer-term debt not only failed to play a controlling role in over-investment, but also provided funds for the real estate business, leading to over-investment and consequently reducing the whole value of the companies.
The Restraint Effect of Different Maturities of Debt on Over-investment. Seen in
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
The results show that 33.54% of companies exist over-investment phenomenon. Regarding to the debt sources, it shows that the credit relations between the upstream suppliers and downstream customers can play a restraint role in business operation, but bank loan enhances over-investment. In essence, this type of loan provides an implicit free cash flow for the companies. For debt maturity, short-term debt will enable managers to repay and pay interest in a relatively short period of time, which will make them to invest cautiously, and reduce the abuse of funds. The short-term debt is able to play a role of monitoring over-investment. However, long-term debt actually provides cash flow to the enterprise, in the hidden and disguised form, eventually contributing to over-investment. Suggestions are as follows:
Strengthen the Supervisory Mechanism of Managers
In recent years, the rapid development of the real estate industry allows managers to see explicit or or hidden huge returns. They seized all available resources to invest. Therefore, we must strictly monitor the internal funds. In addition, we should increase the share-hold of managers in the company, gradually link managers' individual interests with the company interests, drive them to make the investment decisions on the basis of the company's maximum value.
Raise the Governance Effect on Debt in All Aspects
Firstly, we should reform the state-owned property of the bank, gradually realize commercialization of the bank, enhance the bank's external supervision function. Secondly, the special management of the pre-sale funds needs to be strengthened as to avoid the funds used for other purposes and effectively protecting the rights and interests of buyers meanwhile preventing over-investment behavior from happening.
Diversify the Way of China's Debt Financing
We should vigorously develop financial market and promote the level of marketlization, improve the construction of the bond market, and strengthen the effect of hard constraints on over-investment. Meanwhile, we should improve the relationship between the company and the bank, gradually change the features of the homogeneous ownership in banks and companies, further strengthen the supervision and restriction of the bank on the borrowing real estate companies.
